Heuristics, Biases, and Bounded Rationality
The unit opens the behavioural masterclass by stating the four assumptions the standard model makes about the person who decides and then testing the beliefs and the computation against the experiments. It presents Herbert Simon's bounded rationality, the three heuristics of Tversky and Kahneman with their original numbers, Bayes' rule taught with natural frequencies, the two systems of thinking and the Cognitive Reflection Test, Gerd Gigerenzer's reply, the replication record, and what all of this does to the models of the earlier units.
In 1974 two psychologists in Jerusalem spun a wheel of fortune in front of their subjects, let it stop at a number between 0 and 100, and then asked what percentage of the member states of the United Nations were African countries. The wheel had stopped at 10 for one group and at 65 for another, and everyone in the room knew that it had been spun. The typical guess in the first group was 25 per cent, and in the second group it was 45 per cent. The twelve units before this one described a decision maker who would not be moved by a wheel, and that description has carried a great deal of weight, from the demand curve of Unit 3 to the price setters of Unit 10. This unit opens the behavioural masterclass by stating exactly what the standard model assumes about the person who decides, and then testing those assumptions against fifty years of experiments, some of which the standard model fails and some of which it survives.
1 Rationality as economists define it
Every model of the earlier units contains a person who chooses, and the models give that person the same four properties. Economists call the result the standard model of decision making, and in textbooks the person who has these properties is sometimes called homo economicus. Stated plainly, the assumptions are these.
The consumer of Unit 3 who equates marginal utility per euro across goods uses all four assumptions, and so do the firm of Unit 4, the firms that set prices in Unit 10, and the worker of Unit 12 who weighs the cost of a degree against its return. The assumptions are a benchmark rather than a claim that people are calculators. Milton Friedman (1912-2006) made the classic defence of the assumptions in 1953 with the example of an expert billiard player, who makes shots as if he had solved the equations of motion without knowing any of them, and the argument is that a model should be judged by its predictions and not by the realism of its assumptions. The behavioural units take the argument at its word and ask where the predictions fail. This unit tests assumptions 2 and 3, the beliefs and the computation. Unit 14 tests assumption 1 and finds that preferences depend on a reference point, Unit 15 tests its stability over time, and Unit 16 asks whether markets correct the errors of the people who trade in them. Assumption 4, self-interest, is tested in a different literature, on fairness and cooperation, which lies beyond this program.
The probability tool the unit needs is the one Unit 1 introduced, and it is worth restating because the experiments below show people departing from it.
The first economist to object to the four assumptions in a way the profession could not ignore was Herbert Simon (1916-2001). In a paper of 1955 in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice”, he pointed out that the standard model asks for computations that no person and no organization can perform, and he proposed a different picture. A decision maker with limited time, limited information, and a limited mind cannot find the best option and does not try to. Instead, the person searches through options one at a time and stops at the first one that is good enough, a procedure Simon called satisficing, a blend of “satisfy” and “suffice”. The rationality of such a person is real, but it is bounded rationality, limited by what the mind can hold and by the structure of the situation it faces. Simon later compared the mind and the situation to the two blades of a pair of scissors, because neither blade cuts alone and a decision can be understood only from both together. A chess player who could see every possible sequence of moves would never lose, and no chess player can see them, so the good ones use rules that work in most positions. A household choosing a flat visits a dozen of the hundreds on offer and takes the first that clears its thresholds for rent, size, and distance from work. Simon received the 1978 Nobel prize in economic sciences for this work, and the excursion tells more about him.