Jean Tirole
Toulouse School of Economics
- Research field
- Industrial organization, regulation, and two-sided markets
Jean Tirole has analysed how firms with market power behave and how regulators should treat them when they know less about costs than the firm does. With Jean-Jacques Laffont he showed that a regulator does best by offering the firm a menu of contracts, from a cost-based one to a fixed price cap, so that the firm's choice reveals what the regulator cannot observe. With Jean-Charles Rochet he developed the theory of two-sided platforms, such as search engines and payment cards, whose prices on the two sides follow a different logic from the mark-up rule of a one-sided firm. He received the 2014 Nobel prize in economic sciences for this work, and the unit presents his prize lecture, in which he draws the lessons for competition policy.
In the masterclass
Section 6, after the paragraphs on two-sided platforms, presents his prize lecture on regulating firms that know more than the regulator.
The research is presented in Unit 5: Market Power and Strategy, in a research spotlight box that explains the result at the level of the unit and links it to what you have just learned.