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Research spotlight · Unit 2

Alvin E. Roth

Stanford University

Research field
Market design, matching markets, experimental economics

Alvin Roth designs the rules of markets in which prices are not allowed to do the work: the matching of new doctors to hospitals, of pupils to public schools in New York and Boston, and of kidney patients with incompatible donors to one another. For this work he shared the 2012 Nobel prize in economic sciences. In a 2007 essay he asked why some mutually beneficial trades are forbidden and argued that repugnance, the distaste many people feel for putting a price on certain things, is a constraint on markets as real as technology or incentives. The unit uses his essay to close the gap between the model, in which every blocked trade destroys surplus, and the kidney exchange programmes that let the trades happen in kind.

In the masterclass

Section 7, after the kidney exchange cycle and the count of exchange transplants, presents his argument that repugnance limits what markets are allowed to do.

The research is presented in Unit 2: Supply, Demand, and Market Equilibrium, in a research spotlight box that explains the result at the level of the unit and links it to what you have just learned.

The paper

Roth, A. E. (2007). Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(3), 37‑58. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.21.3.37

The scientists named here are not contributors to the Economics Masterclass, are not affiliated with it, and have not endorsed it. The program presents and explains their published research, with references to the original papers.